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ABSTRACT 
In the last years equity exchanges have diversified their operations into business areas such as derivatives trading, post-
trading services, and software sales. Securities trading and post-trading are subject to economies of scale and scope. The 
integration of these functions into one institution ensures efficiency by economizing on transactions costs.  
Using balanced panel data from major equity exchanges over the period 2005-2007, we examine empirically the presence of 
economies of scale in securities trading. Moreover, we analyze the impact of vertical integration of trading, clearing, and 
settlement, the impact of the size of an exchange, and the impact of diversification on the profitability of exchanges. The 
evidence confirms that a large number of transactions leads to low costs per trade. The evidence shows that the profitability 
of equity exchanges is highest for vertically integrated exchanges and that diversification and size have a negative impact on 
their profitability. 
Keywords 
Trading and Post-Trading, Economies of Scale, Integration of Securities Trading, Diversification 
INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, equity exchanges in Europe used to operate their business facing almost no competition. In most of the 
markets a domestic consolidation has taken place several years ago and mainly one national exchange has remained. In the 
last years the exchanges moved towards more consolidation on an international level. The mergers of NYSE / Euronext, 
London Stock Exchange / Bolsa Italiana, and NASDAQ / OMX are the result of this trend. One of the most stated reasons for 
this consolidation were economies of scale.    
Depending on the choice of statistics, the rankings of equity exchanges are totally different: The largest stock exchange by its 
own market capitalization is the Deutsche Börse Group, while the NYSE Euronext is the largest exchange by share trading 
value. The organization of equity exchanges is also very diverging. There are significant differences in governance, covered 
markets, and range of products. While e.g. the NYSE Euronext is providing equity trading services for different markets, the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange is providing trading, clearing, and settlement services for one single market. 
The contribution of this paper is to identify the most important factors that affect the organization of efficient securities 
trading and post-trading. Through a regression analysis the positive effect of the size of an exchange on the per trade costs is 
shown. Moreover, the positive effect of vertical integration of trading and post-trading and the negative effect of size and 
diversification on the profitability of equity exchanges is shown. These findings may help industry practitioners to indentify 
future strategies. They may also help to find the best way to organize trading, clearing, and settlement from a macro-
economic view which is heavily discussed by institutions like the European Central Bank or the European Commission since 
a long time.       
This paper is organized as follows. First, the economies of trading, clearing, and settlement are described. It is followed by a 
review of respective literature. The next section shows the current status of the trading and post-trading industry. Then, 
economies of scale in securities trading are analyzed empirically. The next section evaluates the impact of size, 
diversification, and vertical integration on the profitability of an exchange. The paper closes with a conclusion.   
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ECONOMIES OF TRADING AND POST-TRADING 
Trade Execution, Clearing, and Settlement 
The securities trading value chain consists of a variety of complementary trading, clearing, and settlement activities. The first 
function is the execution of the transaction. In case of an exchange, the orders to buy or sell a security are directed to a central 
marketplace. In the dominating electronic exchanges, the orders are routed to a central computer which matches buy and sell 
orders based on matching algorithms (Pirrong 2008).  Clearing and settlement covers all processes that occur after a trade has 
been executed to finalize the transaction. The actions involve the post-trade transfer of cash and securities (Schwartz and 
Francioni 2004). The need arises after any trade, regardless of whether the parties trade over an exchange or over the counter, 
and whether the trade involves domestic or international securities. Clearing of a securities transaction confirms the legal 
obligation from the trade. Clearing involves the calculation of mutual obligations of market participants and determines what 
each counterpart receives. Central counterparty (clearing) is not included in the definition of clearing. A central counterparty 
(CCP) is an entity that interposes itself between the transactions of the counterparties in order to assume their rights and 
obligations, acting as buyer to every seller and seller to every buyer. The original legal relationship between the buyer and the 
seller is thus replaced by two new legal relationships: between the CCP and the buyer and between the CCP and the seller. 
The substitution of the original counterparty by a new contractual counterparty is called a contract novation. The CCP thus 
bears the counterparty risk and guarantees the clearing and settlement of the trade (Wendt 2006). Following the clearing stage 
the next operation is settling a trade. Settlement is the exchange of cash or assets in return for other assets or cash and 
transference of ownership of those assets and cash. A central securities depository (CSD) is the organization that performs 
this function. 
Network Effects  
The execution of orders is subject to network effects due to the nature of liquidity (Domowitz and Steil 1999). Liquidity 
plays an essential role in financial markets where order flow attracts order flow (Hassan and Schmiedel 2002). It is cheaper to 
execute orders in markets with large numbers of other orders. There are a variety of formal models that demonstrate that 
trading of financial instruments is subject to network economies, which cause average implicit trading costs to decline with 
the number of traders (for more details see Pirrong 2008). These trading costs include the bid-ask spread and the price impact 
of trades. Clearing and settlement are also subject of network effects. Network effects arise in clearing because the greater the 
number of transaction counterparties that use the services of a CCP, the greater the probability that a transaction by a given 
party will be accepted by the CCP, and therefore the greater the utility for that party to buy the CCP services (EU 
Commission 2006).   
Economies of Scale and Scope 
Economies of scale occur when firms achieve per unit costs savings by producing more units of a good or service. Such 
effects arise when it is possible to spread fixed costs over a higher output. The providers of trading, clearing, and settlement 
can achieve significant economies of scale, as the set-up costs for a transaction platform have a substantial portion of fixed 
costs and thus the average costs fall with an increasing transaction volume (Serifsoy and Weiß 2007). For the provision of a 
trading infrastructure high investments in IT infrastructure are necessary. These investments are largely independent from the 
number of transactions. Securities clearing services are also subject to economies of scale. In particular the clearing houses 
have to create the necessary software and IT infrastructure. The maintenance and operation of the clearing systems does not 
vary strongly with the number of transactions processed. Additionally, there are economies of scale in the main function of a 
clearing house - the bearing of risk. There are additional costs if there is more than one clearing house. Multiple clearers have 
to manage the risk between the clearing houses and thus have to maintain costly communication links to the other clearing 
houses (Chlistalla and Schaper 2008). The costs of settlement are also largely fixed. Like trading and clearing, settlement 
requires the creation of a software and IT infrastructure which involves a large fixed component (Schmiedel, Malkamäki, and 
Tarkka 2006). The interlinkage of multiple settlement systems also leads to high costs (Schaper 2008b). 
Economies of scope occur when firms achieve cost savings by increasing the variety of goods and services that they produce 
(joint production). There are strong scope economies in trading, clearing, and settlement. These scope economies influence 
the efficient organization of trading, clearing, and settlement (Pirrong 2008). If multiple products are cleared within one 
clearing house the gains and losses can be netted across the customer’s positions. Through netting the costs of collateral can 
be reduced.  
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Diversification 
Besides providing trading, clearing, and settlement services some equity exchanges are providing other services and products 
(Serifsoy 2007). For example Deutsche Börse, Euronext, and OMX Group are achieving significant revenues from the 
development and operation of IT for other exchanges. They sell their trading systems and sometimes even operate the 
systems for other exchanges. Beside this, most exchanges are providing trading services for non-equities products. In case of 
some exchanges the revenues of these services are notable. As for example SIX and the Deutsche Börse Group are operating 
the European Derivatives Exchange EUREX. Both are achieving larger revenues from derivatives than from equities trading. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
Literature Review 
To date, there are only a small number of studies on the effect of economies of scale on trading and post-trading. There are 
also only singular studies about the effects of vertical integration and diversification on the profitability of exchanges: 
Malkamäki (2000) shows empirically the existence of economies of scale in securities trading by estimating the cost function 
of exchanges for the years 1996-1998. He illustrates that scale economies exist only in the very large stock exchanges but 
that there are significant scale economies with respect of the processing of trades.  
Schmiedel, Malkamäki, and Tarkka (2006) investigate the existence of economies of scale in depository and settlement 
systems. The evidence from 16 settlement institutions for the years 1993-2000 indicates the existence of significant 
economies of scale. The degree of these economies differs by size of the institution and region. While small settlement 
service providers reveal a high potential of economies of scale, larger institutions show an increasing trend towards cost 
effectiveness. For clearing and settlement systems in countries in Europe and Asia substantially larger economies of scale are 
reported than those in the US system.  
Serifsoy (2007) analyses technical efficiency and factor productivity of exchanges by analysing 28 stock exchanges from 
1999-2003. His findings suggest that exchanges that diversify into related activities are mostly less efficient than exchanges 
that remain focused on the cash market. Moreover, his findings show no evidence that vertically integrated exchanges are 
more efficient.  
Pirrong (2008) analyses the economics of securities trading, clearing, and settlement from a micro analytic perspective. He 
shows theoretically the existence of economies of scale in trading and post-trading. Moreover, he demonstrates that 
especially in clearing strong scope economies exist. He also illustrates the impact of economies of scale and scope on the 
organization of these services and shows that the integration of trading and post-trading is the modal form of organization in 
financial markets. 
In literature mostly isolated factors like the effect of size, diversification, or integration on the efficiency of exchanges where 
analyzed empirically. The contribution of this paper is the analysis of the most important business drivers of equity 
exchanges: size, diversification, and vertical integration on the main output of an exchange, the matching of orders. 
Moreover, we analyze the effects of size, diversification, and vertical integration on the profitability exchanges by means of a 
regression analysis. These findings may generate recommendations for the organization of equity exchanges.  
Hypotheses 
From the previous discussion and literature review the following hypotheses are derived and will be challenged in the 
following sections. The reverences indicate associated literature to related research already stated in the previous sections. 
H1 Large exchanges provide securities trading at lower costs per trade than small 
exchanges. 
Malkamäki (2000); Serifsoy 
and Weiß 2007  
H2 Vertically integrated exchanges are able to achieve a higher profit ratio than non 
integrated exchanges. 
Pirrong (2008) 
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H3 Large exchanges achieve a lower profit ratio than small exchanges. Nielsson (2009) 
H4 Diversified exchanges achieve a lower profit ratio than non diversified exchanges. Serifsoy (2007) 
CURRENT STATUS OF THE TRADING AND POST-TRADING INDUSTRY 
One major trend in the equity trading, clearing, and settlement industry is the consolidation via vertical and horizontal 
integration. Horizontal integration involves mergers of institutions or systems providing similar services in different markets, 
such as the merger of trading systems. Vertical integration involves mergers of institutions providing different, but integrated 
services, which are processed along the securities trading value chain within a single entity or group of entities (Serifsoy and 
Weiß 2007). The organization of equity exchanges is very diverging. The majority of the listed equity exchanges are 
operating their captive clearing and settlement entities beside the provision of trading (see Table 1). Eight exchanges of the 
listed exchanges operate clearing and settlement operation as division or wholly owned subsidiary of the exchange. In three 
cases (NYSE Euronext, NASDAQ OMX, and London Stock Exchange) the exchange has an ownership stake or governance 
role, or both, in the clearing and settlement entities. Only two exchanges are exclusively focusing on trading. Two of the 
exchanges offer their trading services for more than one country. The table also shows the market value of the listed equity 
exchangesi.  
Trading Clearing Settlement Market Market Value 2008 
in EUR 
Deutsche Börse Group Germany 13,782,600,000 
Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Hong Kong 9,816,312,314 
NYSE Euronext National Securities Clearing 
Corporation (US), 
LCH.Clearnet (Europe) 
Depository Trust Company (US), 
Euroclear Group (Europe) 
US, France, 
Netherlands, 
Belgium, Portugal 
5,200,748,596 
NASDAQ OMX Group National Securities Clearing 
Corporation (US), 
EMCF (Europe) 
Depository Trust Company (US), 
Nordic CSD (Europe) 
US, Sweden, 
Norway, Finland, 
Denmark, Iceland, 
Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania 
4,469,629,459 
Australian Securities Exchange Australia 3,646,297,500 
London Stock Exchange LCH.Clearnet Euroclear Group UK 3,346,071,414 
BME Spanish Exchanges Spain 1,899,745,478 
TMX Group Clearing and Depository Services Canada 1,737,730,531 
Singapore Exchange Singapore 1,669,790,945 
Bursa Malaysia Malaysia 732,998,350 
Hellenic Exchanges Group Greece 562,474,793 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange South Africa 343,893,133 
New Zealand Exchange Austraclear New Zealand 88,846,192 
Vertically integrated  
Table 1: Listed equity exchanges (ordered by market value) and corresponding clearing and settlement institutions 
The two exchanges with the highest market value are vertically integrated exchanges, the Deutsche Börse Group and Hong 
Kong Exchanges and Clearing (having a higher market value than the other eleven exchanges together).  
Beside of the market (shareholder) value, the net profit ratio (= net profit / revenues) is an important goal for a profit oriented 
company (Groppelli and Nikbakht 2006). The average net profit ratio of equity exchanges over the years 2005-2007 was 44 
percentii. The net profit ratio of most of the vertically integrated exchanges is significantly higher than the ratio of the non-
(vertically) integrated (see Table 2). If ratios could not be calculated they are marked as ‘NA’ (not available). Of those 
exchanges focusing purely on trading services, only the TMX Group and the Istanbul Stock Exchange are performing above 
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average. While the vertically integrated exchanges had an average net profit ratio of 51 percent, the non- integrated 
exchanges only had a ratio of 32 percent.  
The larger exchanges (handling more than 100 million transactions in 2007) have an average profitability of only 34 percent, 
while at the same time the smaller exchanges have an average profitability of 49 percent. The largest exchanges, NYSE 
Euronext and NASDAQ, are showing the lowest profitability with an average ratio of 8 percent. 
Exchange Net Profit Ratio 
2005 (Rank) 
Net Profit Ratio 
2006 (Rank) 
Net Profit Ratio 
2007 (Rank) 
Average Profit Ratio 
(Rank) 
Dubai Financial Market                            0.97 (01.) 1.01 (01.) 1.17 (01.) 1.05 (01.) 
Hong Kong Exchanges and 
Clearing 
0.58 (05.)  0.71 (03.) 0.86 (02.) 0.72 (02.) 
Hellenic Exchanges Group 0.59 (03.)  0.73 (02.) NA 0.66 (03.) 
Singapore Exchange 0.49 (09.) 0.58 (06.) 0.85 (03.) 0.64 (04.) 
Australian Securities 
Exchange 
0.58 (05.) 0.59 (05.) 0.72 (04.) 0.63 (05.) 
Bursa Malaysia 0.59 (03.) 0.58 (06.) 0.72 (04.) 0.63 (05.) 
TMX Group  0.54 (07.) 0.62 (04.) 0.61 (09.) 0.59 (07.) 
Wiener Börse 0.52 (08.) 0.48 (10.) 0.65 (06.) 0.55 (08.) 
BME Spanish Exchanges 0.64 (02.) 0.45 (11.) 0.53 (09.) 0.54 (09.) 
Philippine Stock Exchange 0.37 (12.) 0.52 (09.) 0.65 (06.) 0.51 (10.) 
Istanbul Stock Exchange 0.26 (15.) 0.58 (06.) 0.51 (11.) 0.45 (11.) 
Taiwan Stock Exchange 0.34 (13.) 0.40 (13.) 0.57 (08.) 0.44 (12.) 
Oslo Børs 0.40 (10.) 0.45 (11.) 0.46 (12.) 0.44 (12.) 
New Zealand Exchange 0.34 (13.) 0.39 (14.) 0.42 (15.) 0.39 (14.) 
SIX Group 0.24 (19.) 0.39 (14.) 0.46 (12.) 0.36 (15.) 
Deutsche Börse Group 0.26 (15.) 0.36 (16.) 0.42 (15.) 0.35 (16.) 
London Stock Exchange 0.38 (11.) 0.32 (19.) 0.32 (16.) 0.34 (17.)  
Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange 
0.25 (17.) 0.33 (17.) 0.28 (18.) 0.29 (18.) 
Euronext 0.25 (17.) 0.33 (17.) NA 0.29 (18.) 
Osaka Securities Exchange                         0.20 (20.) 0.24(22.) 0.43 (14.) 0.29 (18.) 
OMX Group 0.17 (22.) 0.25 (21.) 0.23 (20.) 0.22 (21.) 
Tokyo Stock Exchange 0.09 (23.) 0.27 (20.) 0.26 (19.) 0.21 (22.) 
Mexican Exchange Group 0.19 (21.) 0.18 (23) 0.15 (21.) 0.17 (23.) 
NYSE Euronext 0.03 (25.) 0.09 (24.) 0.15 (20.) 0.09 (24.) 
NASDAQ Group 0.07 (24.) 0.08 (25.) NA 0.07 (25.) 
Vertically integrated  
Table 2: Net profit ratios of equity exchanges from 2005-2007 
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
The Model and Data Sample 
The cost structure of securities trading is significantly depending on the scale of an exchange (Pirrong 2008; Malkamäki 
2000). This is due to the large fix costs for the implementation of the trading software and the respective communication 
infrastructure. The matching of orders is one of the main outputs of an exchange. The costs per trade can be seen as indicator 
of how efficient the exchange is providing their main services, the matching of orders (Malkamäki 2000). Due to the 
dominant trading on electronic trading systems the main factor that affects the costs of the exchanges is the number of 
transactions (X). The value and the number of shares are not affecting the costs directly (Malkamäki 2000). Vertical 
integration (VER) of an exchange is modeled as a dummy variable (indicating 1 for vertical integration otherwise 0). Some 
exchanges are diversifying (DIV) and are providing other services than equities processing, such as IT-services, which needs 
to be considered. DIV is a dummy variable indicating 1 for diversification of an exchange and 0 for no diversification. The 
following function for the costs per trade (CPT) indicates the main factors of an exchange (i) for the period (t). 
titititi VERDIVXCPT ,,,, δγβα +++=  
For the testing of H1 we analyzed 26 exchanges for the years 2005-2007 (78 observations). Some observations could not be 
used for the regression (marked as not available ‘NA’ in the tables, single exchanges did not report cost data and are not 
included in the table 3). There are no direct measures available for inputs of stock exchanges. The two most important input 
prices for the operation of stock exchanges are the costs of the trading system and labor costs (Malkamäki 2000). As some 
exchanges do not publish cost information in detail, we use the annual costs of the exchange as proxy for the input of the 
exchanges. We adjust the costs with a diversification factor. In case of diversified exchange, the output proxy ‘number of 
equities transactions’ is only one part of the output of these exchanges. Thus an adjustment of costs data was done. The 
analysis of the annual reports shows that in average 44.5% of the business is related to equities trading and post-trading (the 
analysis of the main cost factor of an exchange ‘staff’ comes to a similar relation). In Table 3 the adjusted costs per trade of 
the largest equity exchanges for the years 2005 to 2007 are listed, as well as the number of equity transactionsiii. 
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Exchange Costs per Trade 
2005 in EUR 
Number of 
Trades 2005 
Costs per Trade 
2006 in EUR 
Number of 
Trades 2006 
Costs per Trade 
2007 in EUR 
Number of 
Trades 2007 
Australian Securities 
Exchange 
4.01 25,214,700 2.65 37,037,600 1.33 65,933,000 
BME Spanish 
Exchanges 
5.22 17,352,719 4.05 23,792,036 2.81 34,862,613 
Borsa Italiana 2.39 47,318,500 3.74 57,594,000 NA NA 
Bursa Malaysia 2.19 14,667,694 1.56 20,453,305 0.96 36,981,597 
Deutsche Börse Group 7.25 87,736,373 5.56 109,018,187 5.07 145,019,545 
Euronext 4.65 78,275,700 3.65 105,258,000 NA 155,036,400 
HELENIC Exchanges 
Group 
2.46 9,153,685 3.07 11,128,589 NA 11,615,994 
Hong Kong Exchanges 
and Clearing  
5.05 24,701,110 2.62 45,020,850 1,03 118,842,305 
Istanbul Stock 
Exchange 
1.46 44,802,600 0.81 45,937,800 0.80 48,538,400 
Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange 
10.41 5,064,042 7.80 7,953,510 6.17 11,553,803 
London Stock 
Exchange 
3.66 66,289,209 1.25 94,799,532 1.60 160,989,634 
Mexican Exchange 
Group 
6.11 1,710,300 7.26 2,476,200 2.26 3,562,027 
NASDAQ OMX Group 0.32 1,076,715,321 0.27 1,317,633,583 NA 1,644,895,464 
New Zealand Exchange 13.17 606,256 15.73 542,233 16.72 577,316 
NYSE Euronext 1.47 912,855,200 1.30 1,264,244,400 0.57 2,320,574,400 
OMX 6.13 5,457,700 4.73 8,825,600 3.69 12,108,600 
Oslo Børs 4.98 21,514,890 3.79 31,666,924 3.76 48,505,407 
Philippine Stock 
Exchange 
4.45 871,499 3.27 1,286,760 2.15 2,634,729 
SIX Group 8.87 17,954,199 3.66 24,475,270 2.74 35,339,296 
Taiwan Stock 
Exchange 
0.59 134,955,600 0.47 162,924,000 0.19 213,203,300 
TMX Group 1.72 58,635,400 1.05 92,139,085 0.99 127,253,300 
Wiener Börse 2.02 3,306,620 4.28 6,500,000 5.23 11,300,000 
 
Vertically integrated 
 
Table 3: Costs per trade and number of trades of selected equity exchanges 
Though vertically integrated exchanges are providing a different scope of services the average costs per trade of the vertically 
integrated exchanges are five percent lower than the expenses from the other exchanges: 3.84 EUR per trade versus 4.05 
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EUR per trade. If there were economies of scale as stated in section 0 one should expect decreasing costs per trade when the 
number of transactions is increasing. This seems to be the case as the number of transactions leads to a reduction of costs per 
trade (see Figure 1). The effect is stronger for the vertically integrated exchanges.  
 
Figure 1: Average costs per trade of equities exchanges (2005-2007) 
Considering the size of the exchanges and the integration of trading, clearing, and settlement is not sufficient to explain the 
costs per trade. Additionally, the diversification has a dominant impact on the costs per trade. Therefore we introduce the 
dummy variable for the diversification of an exchange (DIV). 
Schaper  Organizing Equity Exchanges 
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, San Francisco, California August 6th-9th 2009 9 
Empirical Results 
The analyzed data supports the hypotheses that the size of the exchanges leads to lower costs per trade. It also shows that 
diversification and vertical integration lead to higher costs per trade. Table 4 provides estimates for the variables number of 
transactions (X), diversification of an exchange (DIV), and vertical integration of an exchange (VER). The dependant 
variable in the regression is costs per trade of the exchanges. It shows that the regression with X, DIV, and VER (see column 
4) has a higher coefficient of determination than the regression with either only X (column 1), DIV (column 2), or VER 
(column 3).  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent 
Variables 
Parameter 
(t-statistics) 
Parameter 
(t-statistics) 
Parameter 
(t-statistics) 
Parameter 
(t-statistics) 
Intercept 3.764 
(11.650)*** 
2.758 
(8.332)***   
2.711 
(5.662)*** 
2.252 
(4.607)***  
X -0.0000022 
(-2.946)*** 
  -0.000002 
(-2.823)*** 
DIV  2.555 
(3.891)*** 
 2.948 
(5.019)*** 
VER   1.208 
(1.915)* 
1.229 
(2.236)** 
Adjusted R² 0.117 0.196 0.044 0.384 
F-Statistics 8.681*** 15144*** 3.668* 13.075*** 
N 58 58 58 58 
           *** Significant at the 1 percent level     ** Significant at the 5 percent level   * Significant at the 10 percent level  
Table 4: Regression on cost per trade 
The results support hypotheses H1 that the number of transactions has a negative effect on the costs per trade. This means 
that large exchanges are providing their services at lower costs per trade. Moreover, we see that diversification and vertical 
integration lead to higher costs per trade. 
Schaper  Organizing Equity Exchanges 
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, San Francisco, California August 6th-9th 2009 10 
ORGANIZATION OF EXCHANGES 
The Model and Data Sample 
For the organization of an exchange not only economies of scale need to be considered. As most of the exchanges are profit 
oriented and some even listed companies, the net profit ratio (NPR) is an important indicator for the success of the 
management of an exchange (see Table 1 and Table 2). In the following figure the net profit ratio in relation to the size of the 
exchanges is plotted. 
 
Figure 2: Net profit ratio of equities exchanges (2005-2007) 
The net profit ratio of the exchanges shows that the vertically integrated exchanges are the most profitable exchanges. 
Vertical integration is modeled as a dummy variable (VER) indicating 1 for vertical integration and 0 for no integration. At 
the same time the large exchanges seem to be less profitable than the smaller ones. The size of the exchange is measured by 
the number of transactions (X). The core competence of an exchange are trading and post-trading services. Additional 
services, like IT-services, do not belong to the core competence of an exchange (Serifsoy 2007). One could therefore expect a 
negative effect of diversification (DIV, modeled as a dummy variable) on the profitability of the exchanges. The relation is 
matter of the next equation. 
titititi DIVVERXNPR ,,,, δγβα +++=  
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Empirical Result 
In the following the hypotheses H2, H3, and H4 are tested. Table 5 provides estimates for the variables number of 
transactions (X), vertically integration (VER), and diversification (DIV). The dependant variable in the regression is the net 
profit ratio. The table shows that the regression with X, DIV, and VER (see column 4) has a higher coefficient of 
determination than the regression with only X, DIV, and VER (see column 1, 2, and 3). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent 
Variabl
es 
Parameter 
(t-statistics) 
Parameter 
(t-statistics) 
Parameter 
(t-statistics) 
Parameter 
(t-statistics) 
Intercept 0,452 
(20.087)*** 
0.334 
(8.312)*** 
0.477 
(17.014)*** 
0,429 
(12.533)***    
X -0.00000022 
(-4.163)*** 
  -0.00000018 
(-3.525)*** 
     
DIV  -0.186 
(-2.989)*** 
 -0.139 
(-3.142)*** 
VER   0.169 
(3.329)*** 
0.091 
(2.286)** 
Adjusted R² 0.211 0.098 0.121 0.375 
F-Statistics 17.333*** 8.931*** 11.085*** 13.209*** 
N 61 73 73 61 
 
             *** Significant at the 1 percent level     ** Significant at the 5 percent level  
Table 5: Regression on profit ratio 
The results support the hypotheses that larger exchanges are less profitable than smaller ones (H3). They also support the 
positive effect of vertical integration for the profitability of exchanges (H2). The negative effect of diversification for the 
profitability is supported as well (H4). 
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CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
Equity exchanges have been diversifying their operations into related business areas. Securities trading and post-trading are 
subject to scale and scope economies. The integration of these functions in one institution ensures efficiency by economizing 
on transactions costs. Our analysis confirms that large exchanges are providing trading services at lower costs per trade than 
smaller ones. Whereas integration of trading and post-trading and diversification lead to higher average costs per trade. 
Size and diversification have a negative influence on the profit ratio of equity exchanges, while vertical integration has a 
positive impact. This is supported by the market capitalization of the exchanges that seem to be higher in case of vertical 
integration (see table 1). Reasons for this effect might be among others economies of scope, the reduction of technical and 
organizational interfaces, and the market power. 
We see that large exchanges provide trading at the lowest per trade costs, but vertically integrated exchanges realize the 
highest profits. These results are also confirmed by the current strategies of the exchanges which show a trend towards more 
verticalization of securities trading, with for example the merger of the LSE with the Bora Italiana (which includes post-trade 
services) in 2007 and the integration of trading and post-trading at the SIX Group in 2008.  
The organization of exchanges is important for the different stakeholders: The users, the operators, the shareholders, and the 
regulators. Especially in Europe the vertical integration of trading, clearing, and settlement is discussed controversially (EU 
Commission 2006; Schaper 2008). Our findings show, that the largest exchanges are providing trading at the lowest costs per 
trade. This means that from a macroeconomic perspective horizontal consolidation has to be considered as a suitable 
approach to improve the explicit costs per trade. On the other side competition is important for the development of 
innovations in the area of trading, clearing, and settlement. As for example new trading venues like Chi-X established the 
trading of European securities using the existing domestic infrastructures for the settlement instead of using links or agent 
banks (Chlistalla and Schaper 2008). 
From the shareholders perspective the best way to maximize the profit of the exchange seems to be the integration of the 
securities trading value chain and to focus on single markets rather than providing trading services for different markets.  
Naturally, the potential for monopoly behavior of vertically integrated exchanges needs to be considered properly which 
possibly is one of the most difficult issues and deserves a dedicated monitoring. 
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